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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant James Bailey filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
against his former employer United Airlines, Inc. ("United"), 
alleging he was terminated in violation of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 
U.S.C. S 621 et seq. (2001). The District Court granted 
United's motion for summary judgment and Bailey appeals. 
 
I. 
 
FACTS 
 
Bailey worked as a commercial airline pilot for Pan 
American World Airways ("Pan Am") for most of his career. 
In 1991, after Pan Am declared bankruptcy, United 
purchased some of Pan Am's South American routes and 
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agreed to hire a number of Pan Am's former pilots. Bailey 
was one of the Pan Am pilots hired by United. Bailey was 
59 years old at the time United hired him in October 1992. 
 
Based upon his seniority, Bailey was able to bid for a 
first officer, or copilot, position. To qualify to fly as a first 
officer, Bailey was required to pass United's first officer 
training. He passed the training in November 1992 and 
began working as a first officer. Bailey turned 60 years old 
on March 5, 1993, four months after completing his first 
officer training with United. 
 
Federal Aviation Regulations provide that "[n]o person 
may serve as a pilot on an airplane . . . if that person has 
reached his 60th birthday." 14 C.F.R. S 121.383(c) (2001). 
In compliance with this regulation, United notified Bailey 
that he was no longer qualified to work as a first officer. 
However, Bailey was qualified to bid for a position as a 
second officer, or flight engineer, upon the successful 
completion of the transition training required by United. 
 
United's second officer training consists of a combination 
of ground school classroom work and participation in 
aircraft simulator exercises. After probationary second 
officer candidates complete this preliminary training, they 
take an oral and written exam and a simulator "check ride," 
which is the final test designed to present candidates with 
various real-life flying conditions. According to United's 
policy, if a candidate fails a check ride or requires excessive 
additional training periods, a Board of Review is convened 
and can render a decision that could lead to "remedial 
action, up to and including discharge" of the candidate. 
Supp. App. at 17. 
 
Bailey began the probationary second officer training in 
April 1993 and received a number of low ratings 
("unsatisfactory" or "needs improvement") during the 
training exercises. A written evaluation by Bailey's trainer, 
James Grimm, commented that Bailey was not able to 
perform standard operating procedures. The authenticity of 
this evaluation has been challenged by Bailey. Grimm's 
deposition testimony was that he had created and signed 
only one evaluation form for Bailey, but when confronted 
with a second version of the evaluation uncovered by 
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Bailey, Grimm conceded that another evaluation existed. 
The second version of Bailey's evaluation suggested that 
Bailey performed the standard operating procedures"with 
uncertainty and slowness," which resulted in his failure to 
complete certain items, but did not say he was unable to 
perform standard operating procedures. App. at 115. 
However, Grimm gave Bailey a rating of "needs 
improvement" on both versions of the evaluation. 
 
In later evaluations, Bailey continued to have difficulties 
with ground operations. Training records report that Bailey 
was slow and appeared "unsure of how to deal with 
unusual or irregular problems during all phases of ground 
operations." Supp. App. at 32. However, one training 
evaluator, W. J. Pierson, commented that Bailey"has 
worked incredibly hard to master the DC-10, and he'll be a 
fine second officer for [United]." See Bailey v. United 
Airlines, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 311, 312-13 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
Bailey also received an "above standard" rating in 
"objectivity/motivation/industry." Id. 
 
On April 30, 1993, Bailey failed his simulator check ride. 
Bailey was informed by his instructor immediately after the 
check ride that he did not pass. He was also told that 
United would probably hold a Board of Review, although 
Bailey maintains he was initially given assurances that 
United would provide additional simulator training and 
another check ride. Bailey claims he returned home to 
Pennsylvania for the weekend knowing some action would 
be taken, but confident that he would be given another 
chance. The Board of Review met on May 4, 1993 to 
evaluate Bailey's performance. After considering Bailey's 
record and training, the Board decided to terminate Bailey's 
employment. 
 
Upon Bailey's return to work after the weekend, a United 
official told Bailey things "didn't look good" and that the 
Board was not going to recommend him for further 
training. Supp. App. at 15. Bailey testified that Eric 
Clethen, the new pilot supervisor, called him "a day later," 
approximately May 4, 1993, and told him to report to the 
chief pilot's office in San Francisco the next day. Supp. 
App. at 15. The substance of the telephone conversation is 
the subject of dispute. The parties agree that Bailey 
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informed Clethen that he could not make a meeting on May 
5th, but would be available on May 6, 1993. Bailey arrived 
in San Francisco on May 6th and met with Captain Daly, 
the chief pilot, and Clethen. Clethen gave Bailey the option 
of resigning his employment upon the condition that he 
sign a release of claims against United or have his 
employment terminated. Bailey refused to sign the release 
and he was terminated. 
 
Bailey filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on 
March 2, 1994, claiming that United terminated his 
employment in violation of the ADEA. The ADEA requires 
that a charge of discrimination be filed with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") prior to the 
initiation of a lawsuit in federal court so that the EEOC has 
an opportunity to resolve the dispute. See Bihler v. Singer 
Co., 710 F.2d 96, 97 (3d Cir. 1983). In a "deferral" state 
such as Pennsylvania that has a procedure for conciliation 
by a state agency, the EEOC charge must be filed within 
300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice 
occurs. 29 U.S.C. S 626(d)(2); Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Co., 
935 F.2d 1407, 1413-14 (3d Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
 
Bailey commenced this action on a pro se basis on 
August 14, 1997 and later filed two amended complaints.1 
After Bailey retained counsel, he commenced discovery. On 
June 4, 1999, United submitted a motion for summary 
judgment. The Magistrate Judge granted an extension of 
the discovery deadline and dismissed United's motion for 
summary judgment without prejudice to re-file at the close 
of discovery. On September 27, 1999, Bailey filed another 
motion to extend discovery and a motion to amend the 
complaint to assert claims dealing with fraud, evidence 
tampering, and civil RICO. The Magistrate Judge denied 
both of these motions. United then renewed its motion for 
summary judgment. After all briefing was complete on June 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. On January 8, 1998, Bailey asked the clerk to enter United's default 
for failure to appear, plead, or otherwise defend. United claims that its 
in-house counsel sought and received an extension from Bailey to 
answer the amended complaint and filed an answer within the agreed 
upon time. The Magistrate Judge granted United's motion to set aside 
the default on August 7, 1998 and later reaffirmed that decision on 
August 13, 1998. 
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13, 2000, the District Court granted United's renewed 
motion for summary judgment, finding that Bailey's claim 
was time-barred. Bailey sought reconsideration, which the 
District Court denied on July 28, 2000. Bailey timely filed 
this appeal on August 25, 2000. Bailey seeks reversal of the 
grant of summary judgment, as well as several other 
determinations of the Magistrate Judge and the District 
Court. 
 
II. 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a 
court must "draw[ ] all reasonable inferences from the 
underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non- 
moving party." See Battaglia v. McKendry, 233 F.3d 720, 
722 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). A district court's 
grant of summary judgment is subject to plenary review. 
See Pittston Co. Ultramar America Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 
124 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
The threshold inquiry in evaluating the timeliness of 
Bailey's ADEA claim is to identify the precise unlawful 
employment practice of which he complains. See Del. State 
Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980). Here, Bailey claims 
that United's decision to terminate his employment was 
motivated by unlawful age discrimination. 
 
It is well established that for purposes of filing a charge 
claiming unlawful discharge, the limitations period must be 
measured from the date on which the employee was 
advised of the decision to terminate his or her employment. 
See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258-259, 262 (holding that the 
limitations period commenced to run when the decision not 
to offer tenure was made and communicated to plaintiff); 
Bouker v. CIGNA Corp., 1994 WL 594273, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 24, 1994) (explaining that the applicable limitations 
period begins to run "when the employee knew or should 
have known of the harm inflicted by the adverse 
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employment decision"), aff'd, 70 F.3d 1254 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Guarnaccia v. John Wanamaker, Inc., 1990 WL 90490, at *3 
(E.D. Pa. 1990) (limitations period "must be measured from 
the date the plaintiff was advised he was to be discharged" 
as opposed to the date of separation). Thus, for Bailey's 
charge to have been timely, he must not have known prior 
to May 6, 1993 (300 days earlier) that United had decided 
to discontinue his employment. 
 
Bailey argues that the statute of limitations began to run 
on May 6, 1993, the undisputed day on which he was 
officially presented by United with the option to resign or be 
terminated.2 United argues that the limitations period 
began to run on May 4, 1993, the day United alleges that 
Clethen called Bailey and told him a Board of Review had 
been held and that his employment would be terminated. 
Thus, the question before the District Court on the motion 
for summary judgment was whether there was a genuine 
issue of material fact as to the date Bailey was advised that 
United had decided to terminate his employment. The 
District Court granted summary judgment to United, 
holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
with regard to this date, that Bailey knew of his termination 
prior to May 6, 1993, and that therefore Bailey's claim was 
untimely. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that the charge-filing period 
begins to run on a claim of unlawful discrimination when 
the employer establishes its official position and 
communicates that position by giving notice to the affected 
employee. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258-59, 262. An employer 
establishes its official position when it decides, 
unconditionally, to terminate an individual's employment 
and provides the employee with notice of the unconditional 
decision to terminate his or her employment. Id.  at 257-58. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Bailey alternatively argues that his EEOC filing should be deemed 
timely because he submitted an EEOC intake questionnaire on February 
24, 1994, within the 300-day charge filing period. Bailey did not 
adequately raise this issue before the District Court and thus it is 
waived 
on appeal. Even were the argument not waived, the intake questionnaire 
was not adequate to constitute a charge sufficient to toll the limitations 
period. See Michelson v. Exxon Research and Eng'g Co., 808 F.2d 1005, 
1010-11 (3d Cir. 1987). 
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This court has stated that the charge-filing period begins 
to run on a claim of wrongful discharge under the ADEA 
when the employer has reached a "definitive conclusion" to 
terminate the individual's employment. Colgan v. Fisher 
Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1419 (3d Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
The charge-filing period begins to run only "when the 
employee receives unequivocal notice of the adverse 
employment decision." Grayson v. K Mart Corp. , 79 F.3d 
1086, 1100 n.19 (11th Cir. 1996). Therefore, the statute of 
limitations began to run when Bailey first learned 
unconditionally that his employment with United had or 
would come to an end. 
 
It is that date that is the subject of conflicting evidence. 
Bailey contends that he did not know he would be 
terminated until May 6th, and alternatively that even 
assuming he knew prior to May 6th, United's offer to allow 
him to resign in lieu of termination delayed accrual of the 
limitations period until his response to that offer. It is 
undisputed that on May 6, 1993, Bailey traveled to San 
Francisco and met with the chief pilot, where he was 
officially presented with the option of resigning upon the 
condition that he sign a release of claims against United or 
be terminated. 
 
The central focus of the factual dispute regarding when 
Bailey was advised that United intended to terminate his 
employment is Bailey's deposition testimony. App. at 20. At 
his deposition, Bailey was asked what happened upon 
returning to Denver after the weekend of May 1-2, 1993, 
having failed to pass his check ride the previous week. He 
stated that he was told "[i]t didn't look good" and that "the 
board was not going to recommend [him] for further 
training." App. at 20. Bailey continued to state that he 
"received a call from the chief pilot's office in San Francisco 
a day later and told [sic] to come to San Francisco to be 
terminated." App. at 20 (emphasis added). Bailey further 
testified that in the interim between being told to report to 
the chief pilot's office in San Francisco and the time he 
actually went to San Francisco, he called a number of 
people and asked them to call the chief pilot on his behalf 
in an effort to reverse the decision. It was Bailey's 
understanding the local chief pilot was the "final determiner 
of a position in the company." App. at 29. 
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The evidence before the District Court also included an 
affidavit by Eric Clethen, a member of Bailey's Board of 
Review. Clethen's affidavit differs from Bailey's testimony in 
one material respect. Clethen attests that after the Board 
met on May 4, 1993 and concluded that Bailey's 
employment would be terminated, he "called Mr. Bailey, 
informed him of the Board's decision and asked him to 
travel to San Francisco on May 5, 1993 where he would be 
removed from United's payroll and offered the opportunity 
to resign in lieu of termination." App. at 37a. The District 
Court relied on these two statements for its holding that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
date of termination. 
 
In response to United's motion for summary judgment, 
Bailey submitted an affidavit dated November 10, 1999, in 
which he stated the following: 
 
       [N]o sooner had I learned that the board of review had 
       met than I was asked to travel to San Francisco to 
       meet with the chief pilot. I promptly traveled from 
       Denver to San Francisco to meet with the chief pilot. At 
       the time, I did not know what the chief pilot's decision 
       was; nor did I know what the board of review's 
       recommendation had been. I hoped for the best, but 
       . . . I affirmatively prepared for negative repercussions, 
       and I sought out colleagues who knew my reputation, 
       my professionalism, and my range of experience to 
       articulate that to the chief pilot so as to help assure 
       the best possible outcome. 
 
App. at 91-92. Bailey also stated in the affidavit that "when 
I arrived in San Francisco on May 6, 1993 I was surprised 
to hear that a decision had already been made, and that I 
was to be terminated." App. at 92. The District Court found 
unpersuasive the fact that Bailey attempted to garner 
advocates prior to traveling to San Francisco to affect the 
decision, since "requests to reconsider . . . cannot extend 
the limitations period." Bailey v. United Airlines, Inc., 101 F. 
Supp. 2d 311, 317 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (quoting Ricks , 449 U.S. 
at 261 n.15) (alteration in original). 
 
The District Court held that Bailey could not avoid 
summary judgment by submitting an affidavit that 
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contradicted his deposition testimony without offering a 
satisfactory explanation for the apparent inconsistency. 
Bailey, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 317 (citing Hackman v. Valley 
Fair, 932 F.2d 239, 241 (3d Cir. 1991); Martin v. Merrell 
Dow Pharms., Inc., 851 F.2d 703, 705-06 (3d Cir. 1988); 
Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 504, 
516 n.10 (D.N.J. 1998), aff'd, 179 F.3d 81 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 
The inconsistency to which the District Court referred 
was Bailey's deposition testimony that Clethen called and 
told him to come to San Francisco "to be terminated." The 
District Court viewed this testimony as an admission by 
Bailey that he was informed of United's decision to 
terminate his employment in the May 4, 1993 phone 
conversation. However, as Bailey has articulated, that 
sentence can be interpreted to reflect what Bailey later 
came to understand as the purpose of his meeting. In his 
affidavit, dated November 10, 1999, Bailey said that when 
he arrived in San Francisco on May 6th for his meeting 
with the chief pilot, he was surprised to hear a decision to 
terminate his employment had been made. The District 
Court held that because of this contradiction, the affidavit 
does not create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to 
withstand summary judgment. 
 
The Martin court recognized situations where"sworn 
testimony can quite properly be corrected by a subsequent 
affidavit." 851 F.2d at 705. In a situation "[w]here the 
witness was confused at the earlier deposition or for some 
other reason misspoke, the subsequent correcting or 
clarifying affidavit may be sufficient to create a material 
dispute of fact." Id. In his memorandum of law opposing 
United's motion for summary judgment, Bailey explains 
that his comment "to be terminated" was "merely 
referencing, in hindsight, the irony that he had to travel a 
long distance in order to be fired." Supp. App. at 121-122. 
Bailey suggests that Clethen did not notify him of the 
Board's decision to terminate his employment during their 
phone call. Instead, his statement "to be terminated" simply 
referred to the irony that he later learned he had traveled 
from Denver to San Francisco to be fired and that this 
meaning was obvious at the deposition from the tone and 
cadence of his voice. Supp. App. at 122. 
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In a second affidavit dated June 27, 2000 submitted with 
Bailey's Motion for Reconsideration of the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment to United, Bailey asserted that 
Clethan did not inform him during the May 4, 1993 phone 
call that a decision had been made regarding his 
employment with United. Furthermore, Bailey reiterated 
that he did not know United intended to terminate his 
employment until May 6, 1993, and submitted the 
affidavits of two individuals who accompanied Bailey to the 
meeting on May 6, who stated that Bailey expressed 
surprise upon learning of his termination on that day. 
 
In his brief and reply brief on appeal, Bailey does not 
deny that he uttered the words "to be terminated." Rather, 
he disputes the meaning of this phrase as it was 
transcribed in his deposition testimony. Bailey explains 
that the intended meaning of his remark would have been 
clear had the court reporter inserted an ellipsis or a hyphen 
before the words "to be terminated" in order to connote a 
pause and that this would have alerted the reader of the 
deposition to the intended meaning of his statement. Bailey 
attempted to explain the contradiction in his affidavit dated 
June 27, 2000 by explaining that his words "to be 
terminated" merely referenced in hindsight the purpose of 
his trip to San Francisco. But the District Court refused to 
consider this subsequent affidavit since it contained only 
evidence that was available prior to summary judgment. A 
district court may properly refuse to consider evidence 
presented in a motion for reconsideration when the 
evidence was available prior to summary judgment. Harsco 
Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
Whether or not these affidavits should have been 
considered by the District Court, the evidence presented on 
summary judgment was sufficient to create a genuine issue 
of material fact. The deposition testimony and affidavit on 
which the District Court relied do not show conclusively 
that Bailey received notice that he was going to be 
terminated prior to his meeting on May 6th with the chief 
pilot. The language in Bailey's testimony and in Clethen's 
affidavit does not lead unambiguously to one conclusion. 
 
The Clethen affidavit stated that he "called Mr. Bailey, 
informed him of the Board's decision and asked him to 
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travel to San Francisco on May 5, 1993 where he would be 
removed from United's payroll and offered the opportunity 
to resign in lieu of termination." App. at 37a. The District 
Court opinion interpreted this statement to state that 
"[Clethen] told Bailey that a Board of Review had been held 
and that Bailey would be terminated." Bailey , 101 F. Supp. 
2d at 316. The District Court assumed that Clethen was 
describing what he said to Bailey as distinguished from 
what ultimately happened in San Francisco. While the 
assumption reached by the District Court may ultimately 
be the finding the jury makes, there is contrary evidence, 
and therefore summary judgment was inappropriate. 
 
Bailey's deposition testimony that it was his 
understanding that the "local chief pilots are apparently the 
final determiner of a position in the company," App. at 29, 
can be interpreted as supporting his belief that no final 
decision had been made prior to his meeting on May 6th, 
even if he knew that the Board of Review had made a 
determination. It is consistent with his requests that co- 
workers call the chief pilot to provide an evaluation of his 
performance. In fact, United has not adequately explained 
why it was necessary for Bailey to travel to San Francisco 
at all if notice of his termination had already been conveyed 
over the telephone. When Clethen referred to Bailey's 
termination in a letter to Bailey dated May 14, 1993, 
Clethen wrote that the letter "confirms our discussion on 
May 6, 1993 regarding your failure to meet United Airlines 
standards . . . . You were released from service from United 
Airlines . . . effective May 6, 1993." App. at 54 (emphasis 
added). The letter makes no reference to a conversation 
prior to May 6, 1993 giving Bailey notice of his termination. 
 
Because we conclude that the evidence does create a 
genuine issue of material fact and that summary judgment 
was not appropriate, we need not reach the argument 
presented by Bailey and articulated in the amicus brief of 
the EEOC that United's offer to allow Bailey to resign in 
lieu of termination delayed accrual of the limitations period 
until the time when Bailey responded to that offer. They 
argue that commencement of the statute of limitations 
before the employee has made the decision between 
resignation and termination would encourage the 
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premature and unnecessary filing of charges by individuals 
who later decide to voluntarily resign their jobs. Bailey 
maintains that until he made that decision, nobody, 
including his superiors at United, knew whether he was 
going to be terminated. Thus, the statute of limitations 
could have started running only after Bailey notified United 
that he would not resign. 
 
Inasmuch as Bailey did not present this argument to the 
District Court, it has been waived on appeal. Brown v. 
Phillip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 799 (3d Cir. 2001). We 
hold that the statute of limitations began to run as soon as 
Bailey was informed of the adverse employment decision 
reached by United and presented with the offer to resign or 
be terminated. It appears that this date was either May 4, 
1993, as Clethen stated in his affidavit, or May 6, 1993, as 
Bailey claims. This presents a fact issue to be determined, 
and we must remand for that purpose. 
 
III. 
 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES 
 
Bailey raises a number of additional issues. First, Bailey 
contends that the District Court improperly determined 
that United's motion for summary judgment was timely. 
This court reviews that determination for abuse of 
discretion. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 685 F.2d 
810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that "matters of docket 
control . . . are committed to the sound discretion of the 
district court"). This argument was properly raised before 
the District Court. 
 
The District Court ordered that all dispositive motions be 
filed on or before October 11, 1999. It is undisputed that 
United's motion for summary judgment was submitted on 
October 12, 1999. United contends that because October 
11 was Columbus Day, a federal holiday on which the 
District Court was closed, its filing the very next business 
day was timely. The District Court agreed that the motion 
was timely, consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and relevant case law. Bailey v. United Airlines, 
Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 n.6 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 6; 
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Greenberg v. United States, 873 F. Supp. 912, 914 n.1 
(M.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 46 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding 
that a motion filed one day after a deadline falling on a 
federal holiday is timely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6)). Bailey 
argues that under Rule 6, a federal holiday will extend a 
deadline to the next day only when a computation of time 
is involved. Here, the District Court did not order motions 
to be filed in a specified number of days but instead 
required briefs to be submitted by October 11, 1999, 
leaving nothing to compute. Additionally, Bailey maintains 
that Greenberg ignores the plain meaning of Rule 6 and 
was never reviewed by this court. 
 
The language of Rule 6 ("[i]n computing any period of 
time . . .") does suggest it applies only when a computation 
of time is involved. In fact, the rule would be unnecessary 
in the context of a specified date. However, Greenberg 
involved an analogous situation in which the court had 
ordered that motions be filed on a specific date that fell on 
a federal holiday and the defendant filed the motion the 
following day. Greenberg, 873 F. Supp. at 914 n.1. This 
court did review and affirm the Greenberg decision, 
although we did not refer to this aspect of the decision. We 
will follow that decision. Greenberg is consistent with this 
court's recognition that "broad discretion should be 
accorded district courts in the management of their 
calendars." Titus v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 695 
F.2d 746, 751 (3d Cir. 1982). Thus, we agree with the 
District Court that United's motion was timely filed. 
 
Second, Bailey argues that the Magistrate Judge 
improperly denied his request to amend his complaint to 
include claims alleging fraud, evidence tampering, and civil 
RICO. Bailey's request stemmed from his allegation that 
United fabricated an unfavorable performance evaluation 
for his personnel file. The Magistrate Judge, having held a 
hearing, ruled that Bailey had not made out a prima facie 
case for any of these claims, and denied his request. This 
court reviews a district court's denial of a request for leave 
to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. See Berger v. 
Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 916 (3d Cir. 1990). The 
factors which a trial court may appropriately consider 
"include undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing 
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party, and futility of amendment." Averbach v. Rival Mfg. 
Co., 879 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir. 1989). United claims that 
Bailey failed to appeal the Magistrate Judge's denial to the 
District Court and thus has waived it on appeal. Appellee's 
Br. at 62-65 (citing 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(A); United 
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. N.J. Zinc Co., Inc., 828 
F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir. 1987)). Because Bailey has not 
pointed to anything in the record to demonstrate that he 
raised this issue with the District Court and has not shown 
that there were "extraordinary circumstances," we will not 
consider this issue. See United Steelworkers, 828 F.2d at 
1008 (explaining extraordinary circumstances standard). 
 
Third, Bailey contends that the Magistrate Judge 
improperly denied his motion for an extension of the 
discovery deadline, a matter subject to her discretion. 
Although Bailey included in his statement of the issues to 
be raised in this court whether the trial court"improperly 
refused to grant a reasonable extension of the discovery 
deadline," Appellant's Br. at 3, he failed to argue this issue 
in his brief. See Kiewit Eastern Co., Inc. v. L & R Constr. 
Co., Inc., 44 F.3d 1194, 1204 n. 30 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting 
that under Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5), when an issue is 
presented in the statement of issues raised on appeal, but 
not in the argument section of the brief "the appellant has 
abandoned and waived that issue on appeal") (quoting 
Travitz v. Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund, 13 
F.3d 704, 711 (3d Cir. 1994)). Therefore, this argument was 
waived. 
 
Fourth, in his brief, Bailey includes in his statement of 
the issues "[w]hether the trial court improperly failed to 
reconsider its decision" to grant United's motion for 
summary judgment. Appellant's Br. at 1. However, once 
again Bailey has not addressed this issue in the argument 
section of his brief. Therefore, there is no basis for finding 
that the District Court abused its discretion in denying 
Bailey's motion for reconsideration of its order granting 
United's motion for summary judgment. See Kiewit , 44 F.3d 
at 1204 n.30. 
 
Finally, Bailey contends that the Magistrate Judge 
improperly granted United's motion to set aside the clerk's 
entry of default and the amended order to set aside the 
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clerk's entry of default. A decision to set aside an entry of 
default pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) "is left primarily to 
the discretion of the district court." See Hritz v. Woma 
Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1180 (3d Cir. 1984). However, United 
claims that Bailey did not seek review by the District Court 
of this decision and thus, he has waived the issue on 
appeal. Appellee's Br. at 62 (citing 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(A); 
United Steelworkers, 828 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(stating that "this court has consistently held that it will 
not, absent extraordinary circumstances, address on appeal 
issues not originally presented to the district court" and 
that "to allow parties to challenge magistrates' orders in the 
first instance on appeal would be to permit them to 
circumvent the district courts")). Again, Bailey has not 
pointed to anything in the record to indicate that he raised 
this issue with the District Court and thus, he has waived 
the issue on appeal. 
 
Finally, United has made a very strong argument that if 
this court does not affirm on the grounds of the statute of 
limitations which was the basis for the District Court's 
disposition, we should affirm on the ground that Bailey's 
ADEA claim fails on the merits. The District Court did not 
reach the issue of summary judgment on the merits. If the 
statute of limitations was in fact dispositive, then the 
District Court did not err in failing to consider the merits. 
However, inasmuch as we have held that there is an issue 
of fact on the statute of limitations issue, the District Court 
may on remand turn to the merits issue, which it may find 
dispositive. 
 
IV. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 
decision of the District Court granting summary judgment 
for defendant on the basis of the statute of limitations, and 
will remand for further proceedings as the District Court 
deems appropriate. 
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